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Introduction
Illegal cartels often enjoy long lives, even in jurisdictions where they are targeted for intensive investigation and harsh punishment. Cartels discovered by the European Commission (hereafter "EC") for the years 1985-2011 lasted, on average, more than eight years. International cartels of the 90s sampled by Levenstein and Suslow (2011) take, on average, eight years to break up. Similar statistics have been reported by a number of recent studies. 1 The duration of cartels is believed to depend on features of the cartel's self-policing mechanisms, such as information exchange and compensation (Levenstein and Suslow 2011; Zimmerman and Connor 2005) , and those of market conditions, such as the volume and volatility of demand (Dick 1996; Suslow 2005) or the number of buyers (Dick 1996; Zimmerman and Connor 2005) . Less well understood is whether antitrust policies can have an influence on cartel duration, and how to empirically evaluate the efficacy of the policies. This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the EC's new leniency program. The program commits the EC to the lenient treatment of early cartel confessors. In particular, it grants complete immunity from fines to the first participant in a cartel to inform the EC of the cartel, provided that an investigation into the alleged cartel has not already started. It also offers discretionary fine reductions to conspirators that denounce the cartel when an investigation is already underway. The key question addressed here is how to assess the deterrent effect of such a program on the population of cartels when information from undiscovered cartels is not available. This is worthwhile because, on the one hand, such programs have become increasingly popular instruments for destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels in many jurisdictions around the world (OECD 2002 (OECD , 2003 and have enjoyed proven success in the U.S. (Miller 2009 ); On the other hand, a burgeoning empirical literature (Brenner 2009; De 2010 ) is ambiguous about the efficacy of the EC's leniency. Because the EU and US leniency programs are similar in some important respects but different in others, 3 conclusion about the performance of the former may not be drawn directly from that of the latter.
I structure the empirical analysis by adapting Harrington and Chang's (2009) model of dynamic cartel formation and dissolution where an industry of firms interact repeatedly over 1 An excellent survey of this literature can be found in Levenstein and Suslow (2006) . 2 The exception is Miller (2009) . 3 For example, cartel ringleaders can apply for amnesty in the E.U., whereas in the U.S. they are excluded.
Another related issue is that the U.S. has a plea bargain system that the E.U. lacks where it is possible for cartel participants to receive fine reductions through a plea agreement instead of leniency application.
an infinite time horizon. Absent antitrust intervention, there is a "marginal industry" in which firms are indifferent between collusion and competing because the short-run gain of cheating for each firm equals its long-run benefit from colluding. An efficacious antitrust innovation works its effect by increasing a firm's short-run benefit from cheating to a level that exceeds its long-run gains from colluding. In this way, the policy-innovation moves the "marginal type" from a population of sustainable, longer-lived cartels to a population of unstable, shorter-lived ones. The model generates intuitive predictions that can be used to assess the efficacy of antitrust innovations (such as the leniency program): The impact of an efficacious policy on the duration of discovered cartels is time-dependent. In particular, following an increase in the detection capabilities of an antitrust authority, the marginal cartels immediately break up and the ensuing cartel discovery comes from a population of longer-lasting cartels. Because of such a sample selection effect, the average duration of discovered cartels increases in the short-run;
In the long run, the duration decreases due to the enhanced overall deterrence.
The theoretical model is taken to 126 discovered cartels from the EC for the period December 18, 1985 to December 2011. The introduction of the new leniency program on February 19, 2002 , provides an exogenous shock that identifies the impact of leniency on the duration of discovered cartels. Since that date, the grant of immunity has become automatic and the door of leniency applications has opened to late confessors. It is in these ways that the EC's new policy closely mimicked the US leniency. Therefore, I supplement the EC data with a comparable data set of cartel discoveries from the US Department of Justice (DOJ 1985 (DOJ -2005 .
Together, these data sets provide a basis for assessing the difference between cartel duration under the existing EC leniency regime and that absent the regime.
Reduced form, semiparametric hazard models are used and compared to alternative approaches. The models test whether cartel durations increase immediately following leniency introduction (consistent with enhanced detection) and whether durations subsequently fall below short-run levels (consistent with enhanced deterrence). Unlike earlier studies, my approach allows for a clear-cut separation of the short-run and the long-run impacts of leniency. I am able to control for economic conditions, cartel's self-enforcing mechanisms, and other factors that may influence cartel durations. By way of preview, the time series of cartel durations is consistent with the notion that the introduction of the new leniency program enhanced the detection and deterrence capabilities of the EC. The duration of discovered cartels increases immediately following the introduction of the leniency. The changes are statistically significant, large in magnitude, and robust to various specification and sample choices. The results indicate that the new leniency program may have the intended effects and lend credence to the EC's new policy.
The existing empirical literature of cartel duration has generally been based on a restrictive assumption: The effects of antitrust policies on cartel duration do not vary from the short run to the long run. A single duration elasticity was estimated where the short-and long-run impacts of changes in the policy environment on the hazard function-the conditional probability of cartel dissolution-are not isolated. This assumption will be relaxed here. The assumption is unsatisfactory because: first, that it precludes an analysis of the pattern of policy impact over time; and second that it gives rise to potentially biased estimates of the policy impact by confounding the short-term and the long-term effects. As Harrington and Chang and Miller (2009) have shown, the long-term impact on cartel stability of a policy-innovation may differ quantitatively and qualitatively from the short-term impact. 4 An implication of this result is that no sensible inference can be drawn about a policy's efficacy without first separating the short-term from the long-term impacts.
Both Brenner (2009) demonstrates the theory's ability to reproduce many basic features of the data.
Additionally, the regression samples in Brenner and De are essentially single time series with one or two exogenous policy changes (the EC's 96 and 02 leniency programs). In contrast, I use both the EC and the DOJ data for which similar leniency programs are in place. Cross sectional variation as such may provide more robust identification (Miller 2007 (Miller , 2009 ).
My analysis is subject to at least two important limitations, and the results should be interpreted with caution. The first limitation is that there are too few observations to yield reliable estimates about the long-run impact of the EC's 2002 leniency. To obtain reliable estimates, one needs an adequately number of cartels that are born after the leniency introduction. Only five EC cartels formed following the introduction. To remedy the problem, I supplement the EC data with the DOJ data. A sufficiently large number (40) of DOJ detected cartels formed in the period postdating the DOJ's policy innovation, admitting an analysis of the long-run impact; The second limitation is that the theoretical model requires one to draw inferences about the population of cartels using information from discovered cartels. The inferences are valid so long as the discovered cartels are characteristically representative. In the theoretical model, I assume that all cartels are detected with the same probability. In practice, however, the antitrust authority may focuses its resources towards dealing with cartel cases that surfaced through its leniency program. Although the discussion to follow focuses primarily on cartel offenses, it demonstrates an empirical approach to the study of anti-crime policies that might be of broader interest. Cartels and other forms of crimes such as terrorism, narcotics violations, large-scale fraud, kidnapping, sexual violence and arms and human trafficking share in common an important characteristics:
the offenders hide their activities and the victims do not always report. One observes therefore only discovered crimes. Analyzing the impact of a policy on the criminal activity is difficult because discovered crimes might be a small and characteristically unrepresentative sample of the population of crimes. Exploring the potentially time-varying pattern in average duration of observed crimes following a policy introduction should permit productive analysis of many anti-crime policies heretofore considered difficult.
The second section of the paper considers the theoretical foundation for empirical hazard models of the cartel formation and dissolution process. The implications of the model are explored empirically in the remaining sections. My sample of discovered cartels finds that the duration of collusion consistently reflects the determinants suggested by theory. Concluding remarks and possible extensions follow. 
Theory

Industrial Behavior
where Θ 1 is the set of industries in which collusion can be sustained prior to the innovation.
Rearranging (1), we have thath(t;
is then the weighted average of h(t; σ 1 , θ), where the associated weight is the probability that a cartel with a duration of at least t periods is of type θ.
Let Θ 2 denote the set of industries that are capable of sustaining collusion after the innovation. Due to Harrington and Chang, 9 we have that, if σ 1 < σ 2 , then Θ 1 ⊇ Θ 2 . That is, raising the detection rate reduces the measure of the set of industries capable of sustaining collusion.
After the innovation, formerly stable cartels in the set Θ 1 \ Θ 2 collapse immediately and the distribution of industries shifts from (1−
. But in the short run durations stay unadjusted for the remaining cartels, i.e., their dissolution hazard is unchanged. The average dissolution hazard shifts, in the short run, fromh(t; σ 1 ) to:
The transition from the short run to the new steady state involves the duration of the surviving cartels adjusting in each industry: The industry-level hazard shifts from h(t; σ 1 , θ) to
. As a result, the average hazard readjusts, in the long run, tõ
We now arrive at the main results of the theoretical model: Proofs are postponed to the online Appendix. But it is worth sketching the intuition here, because the comparative statics of this model are fairly intuitive and could result quite reasonably from a variety of dynamic models of cartel behavior. Result 1 of the theoretical model has the empirical analogue that an immediate increase in the duration of discovered cartels following the introduction of a more efficacious leniency program (captured by an increase in σ) is consistent with enhanced detection capabilities. This is because marginal cartels immediately break up, and that the ensuing cartel discovery comes from a population of longer-lasting cartels; Result 2 has the empirical analogue that following the initial increase in cartel durations, a subsequent readjustment below short-run levels is consistent with improved deterrence capabilities. This is because, on one hand, the marginal cartels that are prone to quick dissolution would not form in the first place, entailing a rise in the average cartel durations observed; On the other hand, the formerly stable, long-lasting cartels dissolve earlier, leading to a decline in observed durations. In the long run, the latter effect eventually overcomes and dominates the former.
Data
Data for this study are taken from the complete set of published EC cartel decisions between Besides the problem of inadequate observations for estimating the long-run impact of leniency, the EC data suffers from a lack of reliable information on producer concentration. The variable has been shown to be an important determinant of cartel stability (Selten 1973 ) and 10 Unless otherwise specified, all euro values throughout the paper are adjusted to 2010 e using standard measure of general price trends published by the OECD on the Producer Price Indices for prices, labor costs and interest rates of domestic manufacturing. 11 The White Paper "suggests specific policy options and measures that would help giving all victims of EU antitrust infringements access to effective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated for the harm they suffered". See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html for details. likely to have more competitors than national markets; Some industry types (e.g., mining) are likely to feature higher concentration than others (e.g., wholesale and retail trade) for reasons such as existence of entry and exit barriers (Mann 1966; Martin 1979) . Therefore, I include the scope of the geographic markets (as determined by the EC in its decision) and the type of industries as additional controls for concentration.
Cartel duration. The variables and model parameters are defined in Table 1 , and the corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3 .
Besides reporting proven start dates of agreements, the EC sometimes reports suspected st- 12 Information on the market shares of the cartel participants at the beginning of an infringement in the EC data are largely missing. Moreover, the EC generally distinguishes market share in sales volume and in sales value in its report. DURATION as the number of months elapsed from the proven start date of the first agreement to the end date of the last agreement between any two participants of a cartel. In robustness checks, I obtain similar results using suspected durations.
The straightforward way to differentiate the short-run and long-run effects of leniency, at least as it pertains to the result of Harrington and Chang, is by using cartels' start dates: The short-run effect arises only with cartels that formed prior to leniency introduction; while the long-run effect arises only with cartels that formed after leniency introduction. 15 Panel A of Table 2 provides an overview for the average proven durations of the EC detected cartels by cartel's state and end dates. 13 In various judgments, the Court of First Instance made it clear that it was not necessary, particularly in the case of a complex infringement of considerable duration, for the EC to characterize it as exclusively an agreement or concerted practice, or to split it up into separate infringements. Starting with the short-run effects and looking at cartels that formed prior to July 18, 1996 (column 1 of Panel A, Table 2 ), there is an average DURATION of 82 months for cartels that formed then failed in the pre-leniency period; The average DURATION increased by 23 percent following the introduction of the EC's 1996 Leniency (the average DURATION is 101 months for cartels that formed before but failed under the old leniency program) and more than doubled for cartels that formed absent leniency but failed under the new leniency regime.
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Turning to the long-run impact of the EC's 1996 Leniency and looking at cartels that dissolved under the policy (row 2 of Panel A, where cartels operate. Some of these variables control for, at least in part, the potential heterogeneity in dissolution probabilities across cartels.
It is perhaps by now mother's milk to the industrial economists that in a repeated-game collusion is easier to sustain as players become more patient. The average annual interest rate with 3-month maturity-INTEREST-is the short-term market rate of interest generally available to borrowers. It is used as a presumptive measure of fluctuations in firms' discount factor.
Received industrial organization theory also suggests that business cycle timing may affect cartels' stability (e.g., Green and Porter 1984; Haltiwanger and Harrington 1991; Rotemberg 16 Using total corporate fines during the previous year will not alter the results significantly. See the online Appendix for an analysis using the total corporate fines as a proxy for severity of punishment. There are a number of ways that the size of cartel membership-FIRMS-could affect or be associated with cartel stability. Besides reflecting (inversely) concentration, it may also influence, among other things, the costs of monitoring and coordinating a cartel (e.g., Stigler
(1964), Dick (1996) ). It is worth to note that the existence of some cartels with a large number of firms is not as paradoxical as it may appear: many cartels with a large membership are monitored and coordinated by a trade association.
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Finally, I include two categorical variables, INDUSTRY TYPE and MARKET-SCOPE, to control for the effects of omitted cartel-specific characteristics (e.g., price transparency, market 17 Levenstein and Suslow (2011) make a similar remark on the large number of cartel participation. Brenner (2009) makes a similar remark on the role of trade association in monitoring and coordinating cartels. concentration, industry-specific cyclicality, etc.) that may be correlated with both dissolution likelihood and the included variables of interest. Table 3 , Panel B reports the distribution of industry types and market scope.
The Empirical Framework
To analyze the influence of competition policy and that of economic environment on the duration of cartels, hazard models were estimated. My focus here is the effect of each exogenous characteristic of the cartel on the probability of cartel dissolution, conditional on cartel not having already collapsed, and holding other industry and institutional characteristics constant.
In what follows, I discuss two alternative empirical specifications and investigate the robustness of the results. The second specification is a generalization of the first. It should be stressed that the empirical models I am using are reduced form models and not structural models. 
where t is the elapsed time since the start of a cartel, x i is a vector of observed explanatory variables. The parameter vector β is the vector of coefficients, measuring the influence of observed characteristics. The term exp(x ′ i β) shifts the baseline hazard function h 0 (t), and a positive coefficient indicates that the observed characteristics increase the dissolution hazard and reduce the cartel duration. The model is semiparametric in that the baseline hazard h 0 (t) is a nonparametric function of time, with the influence of other observable characteristics specified assuming a particular functional form. Furthermore, the model is a proportional hazard one since the ratio of the hazard function for any group with certain observed characteristics to that of the baseline hazard equals a constant, dependent only on the observed characteristics;
i.e, h(t)/h 0 (t), the relative hazard function, is not time varying.
Suppose that there are n observations and k distinct cartel dissolution times. Further suppose that I can rank the dissolution times such that t 1 < t 2 < ... < t k where t j denotes the dissolution time for the jth cartel. Furthermore, let R j denote the set of cartels that have not dissolved until time t j . Then the probability that the ℓth cartel will dissolve at time t j given that some cartel in set R j will collapse at time t j is
Taking the product of the conditional probabilities in (3) yields the partial likelihood function
, with corresponding log-likelihood function
Competing risks. A cartel can end for different causes: Besides "natural death" such as defection, independent discoveries by an antitrust prosecutor can also end a cartel. Therefore, estimation of the cartel dissolution hazard function from observed cartel duration times must also consider the censoring of duration for cartels ending due to antitrust interventions (Levenstein and Suslow 2011). For such cartels, we can only infer that collusion would have exceeded the observed cartel duration at the time of the cartel's dissolution. 18 The advantages of using Cox (1972) A popular choice towards the analysis of competition risks is using a stratified Cox model from augmented data (Lunn and McNeil 1995) . Let ϕ denote a cartel's failure type where ϕ = 0 indicates those cartels collapsed in a natural death; ϕ = 1 indicates those cartels ceased by an antitrust intervention. The joint distribution of failure times and cause of failure is considered and the hazard function of a particular cause in the presence of all other causes is estimated. In the absence of ties (i.e., multiple cartel groups fail at the same t j ) the full partial log-likelihood is given by
where β 0 is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for different types of cartel dissolution differ by a constant ratio.
Running standard Cox regression on the augmented data set gives the appropriate estimates of the regression coefficients, provided the model fit it good. The partial likelihood which results from the method is precisely the partial likelihood suggested by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) for competing risks.
Testing The Time-Varying Effects of Leniency. I conduct two statistical tests. In the first, I examine whether the dissolution hazard of discovered cartel decreases in the short run after the introduction of leniency. Result 1 of the theoretical model suggests that such a decrease is consistent with enhanced detection capabilities. Recall that the short-run effect of leniency arises only with cartels that formed prior to the leniency introduction. Therefore, I run regressions on the sample of cartels that formed prior to July 18, 1996 . Because the regression model generates an immediate decrease in the hazard if an only if the coefficient of LENIENCY-SR is negative, I test the hypothesis:
where β LEN −SR denotes the coefficient of LENIENCY-SR.
In the second test, I examine whether in the long run the hazard increases beyond the short-run levels. Result 2 of the theoretical model suggests such an increase is consistent with enhanced deterrence. Recall that the long-run effect of leniency arises only with cartels that formed after the leniency introduction. But as already mentioned above, there is a lack of observations on EC cartels that formed in that period. Therefore, I run regression on the time series of DOJ detected cartels that dissolved under the DOJ's 1993 leniency-a program that 
Empirical Evidence
Duration of Cartel Dissolution
Graphical analysis. Figure 1 Next, I graph the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier hazard functions. The empirical hazard is the fraction of undissolved cartels at the start of a month which dissolves in that month.
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Using cartels born prior to July 18, 1996 but excluding cartels dissolved under the old leniency, these functions plot rates of cartel dissolution against the cartel durations. Figure 2 depicts the short-run movements of the empirical hazards following the introduction of the new leniency.
The squared line (resp. smooth line) corresponds the short-run (resp. long-run) hazard profile under the new leniency (resp. absent leniency). As shown, the introduction of the new leniency immediately results in a hazard profile with lower probabilities of dissolution. This pattern becomes more pronounced as time elapses. Result 1 of the theoretical model suggests that such a change is consistent with enhanced detection capabilities.
At face value, the graphical analyses suggest that the short-run effect of the leniency predicted by Harrington and Chang's theory may be a reasonable approximation to actual impact.
However, there is a reason to doubt this conclusion: The graphic analyses do not isolate the effects of leniency from those of changes in the economic and institutional environment that took place at roughly the same time. For example, the level of fines has increased steeply after
(Russo et al. 2010)
. 20 The next section will explore these empirical issues more rigorously.
Finally, notice that changes in the empirical hazards are hardly monotonic over time: Following an initial temporary rise, the long-run hazards absent leniency quickly fall. Then the hazards recover around year 12 and finally exceed initial levels. Temporarily putting aside the empirical issue of whether these conflicting movements are due to random data outcomes or real economic forces, this graphic analysis suggests that a monotonic base-line hazard imposed by a Weibull specification, such as that in Brenner (2009), may not be suited to capture these movements.
Regression analysis. Table 4 reports the Weibull (specification (1)) and Cox (specifications (2) and (3)) regression estimates of the coefficients on the explanatory variables. 21 Our focus here is on the effects of leniency. The interpretation of the coefficients of the other factors will either be discussed very briefly or omitted here.
The regression analysis is performed in two steps. In the first, I run regressions on the complete EU sample and make the hazard rate a function of the antitrust policies and the In the second step (specification (3)), I use the same set of explanatory variables as in the previous specifications. But I exclude cartels that are born after the leniency introductions. As mentioned in the introduction, this enables me to isolate the short-run impact of the implementation of the leniency programs from the effects associated with the long-run adjustment process of cartel durations. The coefficient of LENIENCY-SR in this specification is the shortrun impact on the hazard of introducing leniency. If a statistically significant impact is found with this modification, then we can conclude that the rejection of significant policy effects in the first step was in fact due to the estimation biases stemming from a lack of isolation of long-run intervention effects.
For the regressions run on the complete EU sample, reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table   4 , the coefficients of EC's 2002 LENIENCY-SR (The coefficients are −1.047 and −1.076 for specifications (1) and (2), respectively.) are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the EC's new amnesty may have failed to destabilize and deter cartels. These results, largely resembling 21 The continuous variables are in terms of natural logs so that the coefficients in the equation equals the duration elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to the independent variables. In addition, I add one to all values before taking natural logs because some observations report zero values. and December 2011. *** significant at 1 percent level. ** significant at 5 percent level. * significant at 10 percent level.
those of Brenner's (2009) and De's (2010) models, deserve scrutiny. One limitation of specifications (1) and (2) is that leniency programs, to the extent they have any impact, are constrained However, these effects are not statistically significant.
Turning to the measures of (anticipated) market demand fluctuations, the coefficient of ∆GDP is significantly negative in specification (3). This means that when the market is experiencing a demand growth, as represented by an increase in ∆GDP, the probability of dissolution is reduced. The result provides some support for the oligopoly theory which suggests that cartel stability is tied to business cycle timing. For stance, Haltiwanger and Harrington organizational features, and (7) cross-sectional variations from the US DOJ data.
Alternative Cartel Duration Measure
An antitrust authority may not want to jeopardize its case by aiming to prove what it thinks is the correct start date. Instead, it may aim for an outcome that inflicts adequate punishment and results in a conviction. 22 Therefore, the authority may not pursue an aggressive strategy with regards to proving long cartel duration. As a first robustness check, I test whether my results are robust to alternative measure of cartel duration. I rerun the specification in the third column of Table 4 but measure the speed of cartel dissolution by DURATION-2-the lengths of cartels' lifetime that are suspected by the EC but not necessarily with supporting document evidence. The coefficients in the first column of Table 5 (specification (4)) show that my results are robust to alternative definition of cartel duration.
Confounding Influences of the DOJ's Antitrust Interventions
Twenty cartels in the pre-leniency EU sample operated not only in European but also in American markets. They are subject to American antitrust law rules and, obviously, their durations are likely to be affected by the DOJ's enforcement programs (e.g., the DOJ's 1993 Note.-Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are shown in parentheses. Omitted LENIENCY-SR category is "no leniency". Omitted industry category is "wholesale and retail trade". The source for these values is author's calculations based on 126 cartel decisions by the EC between December 1985 and December 2011. *** significant at 1 percent level. ** significant at 5 percent level. * significant at 10 percent level. Omitted market scope category is "national" cartels.
a The sample consists of cartels that started prior to July 18, 1996 according to suspected start dates.
b The sample consists of cartels that started prior to July 18, 1996 according to proven start dates but excludes cartels that operated in US markets.
Leniency Program) and efforts. To isolate the potentially confounding influences of the US antitrust interventions, I rerun the specification in the third column of Table 4 Table 5 documents that my main conclusion is robust to isolating this subsample.
Did Cartels Anticipate the New Leniency Program?
The empirical strategy rests on the assumption that cartels did not anticipate the introduction of the new leniency. But an interesting feature of the data is that the durations actually spike prior to the introduction of the new leniency and one may naturally relate the spike to an anticipation effect. Indeed, it sometimes takes a considerable length of time before an EU legislation (e.g., the EC 's 2002 leniency) is adopted. During that time, through a public consultation and other deliberations, it was known to the interested parties that a policy change is likely on the way. Cartels might therefore have been paying attention to and reacted upon the potential leniency introduction before the EC formally adopts the leniency. Table 4 . The resulting coefficient (-3.012) is negative, large in absolute value and again statistically significant at the 1 percent level (specification (6), column 3 of Table   5 ). Redefining LENIENCY-SR as if the new leniency were introduced 12 months sooner yields similarly large and significant coefficient for the effect of the leniency (as Table 8 in my online Appendix reports). Overall, therefore, the results lend statistical support for enhanced detection capabilities due to the introduction of the new leniency. 
Leniency Programs versus Placebo Policies
My empirical model imposes two exogenous breakpoints at the dates of leniency introduction- misspecification. To see if this is the case, I re-run the regression model in column 3 of Table 4 but use alternative breakpoints in the data and compare the maximized log-likelihoods across the regressions. is greater than those produced by all but one placebo intervention that immediately follows the leniency introduction. The single offending placebo intervention corresponds to a sharp increase in DURATION of one cartel that dissolved in the first period after the leniency introduction.
Panels B and C show that the results are similar when three-month and twelve-month periods are used. In the twelve-month case, the regression fit is globally maximal when the breakpoint is imposed at leniency introduction.
In Figure 5 of the online Appendix, I plot the log-likelihoods produced by breakpoints that are chosen before and after the introduction of the EC's 1996 leniency. The maximized loglikelihood produced by the old leniency is greater than those produced by all but one of the placebo interventions. Overall, the robustness check provides some support for the empirical specification.
Time-Varying Effects of Fines and Economic Conditions
To (1981), I assume that β(t) is a vector of linear functions of time. This is equivalent to adding an interaction term of x and time to the model, which was proposed by Cox (1972) to check the assumption of proportional hazards for the covariates. In the absence of ties (i.e., multiple cartel groups collapse at the same t j ) the full partial log-likelihood is given by
where, as before, ϕ = 0 (resp. ϕ = 1) indicates those cartels collapsed in a natural death (resp. an antitrust intervention).β 0 is a constant so that the baseline hazard functions for different types of cartel dissolution differ by a constant ratio.
The generalized model reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 (specification (7)) allows variation in penalties and macroeconomic conditions to change both the slope and intercept of the relationship between the log-hazard function and the log of current duration. The coefficients reported under the heading "TD" (abbreviation for "time-dependence") gauge the effect of changes in penalties and economic environments on the slope, or duration elasticity, of this relationship. The coefficients reported under the heading "BL" (abbreviation for "baseline") generate parallel shifts in the log-hazard function. As shown, the generalization has no qualitative effect on my main result: The average duration of detected cartels increases immediately after the introduction of the new leniency.
Nature of Infringement and Cartel's Organizational Features
The hazard function reported in Table 6 (specification (8)) controls for types of infringement and cartel's organizational features as covariates. While some of the studies cited in the introduction include these variables, it may be argued that they are endogenous variables. The main point to extract from my analysis here is the robustness of the empirical regularities that following the introduction of the new leniency, the average duration of discovered cartels increases in the short run.
Evidence from The United States
The Descriptive statistics of cartel duration. In the online Appendix, I have a table (Table   9 ) that provides an overview for the average durations of the DOJ detected cartels by their start and end dates. The table shows that in the pre-leniency DOJ sample, the average duration of cartels that failed in the period preceding August 10, 1993 is markedly lower than that of cartels that failed after the leniency revision; Moreover, in the post-leniency DOJ sample, the average duration of cartels that formed prior to the leniency revision is higher than that of cartels formed after the revision.
Graphical analysis. The figure ( Figure 6 ) that I present in the online Appendix plots the semi-annual average duration of detected cartels. The figure shows that the average duration of cartels that dissolved in the first eight periods immediately following the leniency introduction is markedly higher than that of cartels that formed and failed before the policy change; Moreover, the average duration long after leniency revision is lower than that of the first eight periods after the policy change.
Taking together and evaluated within the framework of the theoretical model, the descriptive statistics and the graphical analysis suggest that the increase in average duration in the short run around leniency revision is consistent with enhanced detection capabilities; and that the subsequent readjustment below short-run levels is consistent with enhanced deterrence capabilities.
Regression analysis. I run two regressions: First, I consider the short-run effects of leniency. I rerun the model in column 3 of Table 4 on the sample of DOJ cartels that started before the introduction of the DOJ's new leniency and use additional variables. The variable DOJ LENIENCY-SR divides the pre-leniency DOJ sample into two groups: one consisting of cartels dissolved before the leniency introduction and the other of cartels dissolved after the leniency introduction. The coefficient of DOJ LENIENCY-SR is the short run effect of leniency on the hazard. Estimates of the coefficients are presented in columns 1 Table 7 . 24 It turns out that while the magnitudes of the effects of the antitrust policies vary, the main result of the previous sections holds: The estimated DOJ LENIENCY-SR coefficient of −0.486 corresponds to an immediate 63 percent (exp{0.486} − 1 ≈ 0.63) decrease in dissolution hazard and is statistically significant, consistent with enhanced detection.
Next, I consider the long-run effects of leniency. Column 2 of Table 7 shows that the regression results from the sub-sample of 86 cartels that dissolved after the leniency introduction.
The variable DOJ LENIENCY-LR divides the sub-sample into two groups: one consisting of cartels started before the leniency introduction and the other of cartels started after the leniency introduction. The coefficient of DOJ LENIENCY-LR is the difference between the short-and long-run effects of leniency on the hazard. The estimated DOJ LENIENCY-LR coefficient is positive and statistically significant, and corresponds to a 9.11 times (exp{2.314} − 1 ≈ 9.11) 24 For brevity, the industry fixed effect coefficients are postponed to in the online Appendix. increase in the dissolution hazard from the short-run levels. I interpret the result as evidence that the new leniency enhanced the DOJ's deterrence capabilities.
Conclusion
The social costs of cartel have motivated an extensive literature investigating the efficacy and design of anti-cartel policies. However, due to their illegal nature, cartels conceal their activities and one observes only discovered cartels. Because the discovered cartels might be a small and characteristically unrepresentative sample of the population of cartels, one cannot infer the efficacy of an antitrust-innovation on the population of cartels based on information gleaned from the discovered cartels without additional assumptions being made that may or may not be correct. This article takes one step to address the problem.
I adapt a model developed by Harrington and Chang (2009) where an industry of firms interact repeatedly over an infinite time horizon. An efficacious antitrust innovation increases a firm's short-run gains from unilateral deviation to a level that exceeds its long-run gains from colluding. In this way, some cartels would have been sustainable and long-lived in absence of the policy becomes unstable and shorter-lived. The model predicts that in the short-run, a more aggressive detection and conviction policy increases the average duration of detected cartels due to enhanced detection; In the long run, the average duration observed decreases due to enhanced deterrence.
Using data on discovered and prosecuted cartels from the EC, I estimate the influence of the EC's new corporate leniency program on the timing of cartel dissolution. My empirical work is the first that shows that, consistent with the theory, the duration of discovered cartels increases immediately following the introduction of a more efficacious leniency program and then falls below short-run levels.
Future empirical work should comprehensively address the issue of causality between leniency and cartel duration. This paper emphasizes the effect of leniency on duration, but there may be simultaneity: for example, it is sometimes thought that the origins of enhancements in the EC's detection and deterrence capabilities came from the US. The implementation of the DOJ's leniency programs in 1978 and 1993 followed an better understanding, in the US as well as in other jurisdictions, of cartel damages and duration. Similar policy innovations in the EU might have been triggered, at least partly, by such enhanced understanding. Though my analysis of the DOJ's leniency is free of the aforementioned endogeneity problem, a more rigorous empirical analysis to determine causality should be performed, ideally by having an instrumental variable for the EC's leniency introduction. Nevertheless, the analysis using the DOJ data finds that leniency has a causal impact on cartel duration, in line with the theory and my analysis of the EC time series of cartel duration.
My regression samples are essentially two time series with three policy changes. Crosssectional variation could provide more robust identification, and the recent introduction of leniency programs by antitrust authorities at individual European member states may provide this variation in future research. Moreover, some cartels may have been discovered at member state level even though their operation may have been wider. The EC's leniency programs could well have an influence on these cartels although they have so far escaped the EC. Nevertheless, insofar as the effect of leniency-my main results-is concerned, the validity of the parameter estimates does not require that the regression sample include undetected cartels.
On balance, the evidence in favor Harrington and Chang's theory is strong. Harrington and Chang's dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution does provide a simple but theoretically consistent way of analyzing cartel duration determinants, and it does receive some empirical support. My interpretation is that it is a promising way of bringing some understanding to the empirical regularities in this complex area.
